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Abstract
This paper investigates individual motives to participate in rotating savings and credit as-
sociations (roscas). Detailed evidence from roscas in a Kenyan slum (Nairobi) suggests that
most roscas are predominantly composed of women, particularly those living in a couple and
earning an independent income. To explain this phenomenon, we propose an argument based
on con°ictual interactions within the household. Participation in a rosca is a strategy a wife
employs to protect her savings against claims by her husband for immediate consumption. The
empirical implications of the model are then tested using the data collected in Kenya.
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Rotating savings and credit associations (roscas) constitute one of the most commonly found infor-
mal ¯nancial institutions in the world, and particularly in Asian and African countries.1 In these
associations, a group of individuals, who typically live in the same community, gather for a series
of meetings. At each meeting, each of them contributes a pre-determined amount into a collective
`pot' which is then given to one member. The latter is then excluded from receiving the pot in
future meetings, while still being obliged to contribute to the pot. The meeting process repeats
itself until each member has received the pot. There is substantial variation among roscas as to the
frequency of the meetings, the amount of the contribution, the number of members and the way
the order of the winners is determined. In some this process is random, determined by drawing
lots, in others it is a bidding process, through which the pot goes to the highest bidding individual
(see Ardener (1964) for a detailed discussion of the various ways to allocate the pot).2
In the literature (see, in particular, the empirical analyses by Besley and Evenson (1996) and
Evenson and Besley (1996) on Taiwan), roscas are usually viewed as a way for individuals with little
or no access to formal credit markets to save up for the purchase of indivisible durable goods.3 As
there is no interest to be gained by saving in a rosca, the question is why do individuals choose to
save through a rosca instead of individually accumulating savings? In their seminal contributions,
Besley, Coate and Loury (1993 and 1994) argue that, on average, roscas allow individuals to receive
the pot, and hence to buy the durable good, earlier than through individual savings. While, ex
ante, all individuals are thus better o® by saving through a rosca, the member who receives the
pot last is ex post worse o®.4
This hypothesis however is apparently not supported by the evidence we collected on a sample of
520 households in a Kenyan slum, called Kibera, located on the outskirts of Nairobi. The majority
of roscas in Kibera (there are a total of 385 in our sample) do not systematically have a random
or bidding order.5 In most instances, there is a pre-determined order which is known before the
1See, for example, Bouman (1977), for a list of countries in parts of Africa, Asia, the Americas, Caribbean, Middle
East, and early Europe where roscas have appeared.
2Kovsted and Lyk-Jensen (1999) compare the performance and e±ciency of the bidding and random roscas.
3The work of Handa and Kirton (1999) on Jamaica , van den Brink and Chavas (1997) for Cameroon, and Gugerty
(1999) for rural Kenya similarly ¯nd evidence that rosca funds are used for durable goods purchase.
4In fact, at least the last member is worse o® (ex post) by joining the rosca. This follows because the savings rate
(i.e., contribution) imposed by the rosca is feasible for this member if he saves on his own, but typically not optimal.
5In contrast, Calormis and Rajaraman (1998) ¯nd a prevalence of roscas with concurrent bidding. As a result,
2rotation cycle begins. Typically, while the original order might have been chosen randomly, the
order of the winners tends to be repeated throughout the cycles: 69.2% of the roscas in our sample
do not change their order after a cycle. (The median number of cycles in our sample is 3.2, and
the median length of a cycle is 6.1 months.) As a result, at least after one full cycle, there is no
randomness in receiving the pot. The rationale proposed by Besley, Coate and Loury (1993) does
not apply here since it cannot explain why, after one full cycle, the last recipient would stay in the
rosca (and by backwards induction the rosca breaks down).
Another observation from the data is that an overwhelming majority of rosca members are
women: 84%. This is unlikely to have arisen randomly and the gender issue in roscas has yet to be
investigated.6
In this paper we develop a new argument based on intra-household con°ict to explain rosca
participation. This argument originates from semi-open interviews conducted among women from
informal groups in Kibera. In those discussions, women often saw their use of roscas as a way to
hide money from their husbands (and possibly other members of the family).7 For example:
\Joining a merry-go-round (i.e., a local rosca) is the only way to save some money. If I
leave it at home, it will disappear."
\You cannot trust your husband. If you leave money at home, he will take it."
\In our group, we have secret meetings. Members cannot talk outside. There are bad
husbands who take the money, and do not provide their wives with food and basic goods
... People quarrel a lot."
\We wanted only women in the group, we are more free, and we can talk and laugh.
Men always want to take the lead. They are like children ... They are not interested
in improving the situation of the family."
they suggest an insurance role for roscas instead of a device to purchase an indivisible durable good.
6There are several other studies which ¯nd that predominantly women join roscas. Ardener (1964) points to
several case studies where roscas are composed only of women in India, Malaysia, Ghana, South Africa, Sudan, and
Egypt. Geertz (1962) also ¯nds that almost all women belong to several rosca groups in Eastern Java.
7Con¯dentiality of discussion and procedures matter a lot in all informal groups. Members are usually not allowed
to talk about the groups they belong to with others. Such secrecy is clearly aimed at protecting members against
theft or malfeasance, but also to ensure freedom of speech during the meetings, and to avoid the formation of hidden
alliances outside the group meetings. In the 44 informal groups we interviewed in some depth, 6 of them have explicit
written rules to punish members who violate this obligation (see also Appendix A, section 7.4).
3We demonstrate that if men have a greater preference, relative to women, for present consump-
tion than saving for an indivisible good, then women are better o® if they save in a rosca than at
home. Essentially, roscas provide a forced savings mechanism that the woman can impose on her
household. Roscas help to increase the household's saving rate.8 The household may indeed be
willing to purchase the indivisible good ex post, when the wife returns home with the pot, even in
those cases where, ex ante, it was not willing to save at all.
Our theory predicts that income earning women are more likely to save in roscas if they are
married. In Kibera, the probability that a woman (18 years and older) participates in a rosca is
40.0%. If she lives in a couple, this probability rises to 53%, while it falls to 25.3 % if she does not
live in a couple. When she is working, her participation rate increases to 68.5%, and to 74.4% if
she simultaneously lives in a couple. By contrast, the participation rate of a working woman who
does not live in a couple is only 54.7%. The participation rate for men is 10.1%, for working men
is 12.4% and for working men living in a couple, it is 9.6%.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a model of con°ict in the household
and derives empirical implications. Section 3 summarizes the data and an empirical test of our
theory is subsequently provided. An alternative explanation is discussed in Section 5 and Section
6 concludes.
2. Disagreement in the Household
Consider a household composed of two individuals; husband and wife. The con°ict between mem-
bers of the couple centers around their di®erent preferences for an indivisible good, the purchase
of which requires accumulated savings. Assume that, relative to men, women always have a larger
preference for the good. As a result, they would like to choose a higher savings rate to purchase
the good than men would. (It is also possible that men do not want to purchase the good at all.)
Such a di®erence in preferences is conceivable for several types of household goods. For a good
such as school fees for children, for example, it is likely that women have a larger preference for this
good due to gender speci¯c preferences for children. Or men may be more subject to social pressure
8Krahnen and Schmidt (1994) in their overview of informal ¯nance in developing countries also note: \But there
is another socially valuable function which Rosca members seem to value highly: in many countries and cultures the
participation by individuals in such groups creates a senior claim of the participant on resources that otherwise would
have been absorbed by the `sponge' of family needs." (Krahnen and Schmidt, 1994: 47). This is exactly the claim
we want to investigate here.
4to transfer money to outside family members, or to reveal status by conspicuous consumption, which
both reduce their incentive to save relative to women. Bruce (1989) cites numerous case studies,
throughout the developing world, which illustrate the tension within households over the use of
income. Most studies ¯nd that childrens' well-being is strongly correlated with women's income
relative to men's, where women consistently devote a higher proportion of their income to family
needs than do men. Men withhold a proportion of their income for personal use, even when families
live in or near poverty. Bruce notes that these gender-based di®erences are most explicit in Africa,
where it is commonly believed that men have a right to personal spending money, which they are
perceived to need or deserve, while women's income is used for collective purposes. The work of
Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) empirically veri¯es the claim of numerous case studies of African
households that, relative to women, men spend a greater proportion of their income on goods such
as alcohol and cigarettes, whereas women are more likely to purchase goods for children and for
general household consumption.9 In the same vein, Thomas (1990) ¯nds that unearned income in
the hands of a mother has a bigger e®ect on a family's health than when under the control of the
father; for child survival probabilities the e®ect is roughly twenty times larger.
Although husbands and wives typically earn independent incomes, the di®erence in savings
patterns induces a potential con°ict, as household decision making is joint. As a result, a woman
is forced to choose a savings rate lower than her optimum. By contributing to a rosca instead of
accumulating at home, a woman prohibits her husband from spending her savings by rendering
them illiquid. Once a woman has committed to a contribution schedule, sanctions prevent her
husband from forcing her to renege on this contract. Firstly, roscas typically do not reimburse past
contributions of defaulting members. (Since a man is unlikely to know when his wife initially joined,
realizing this too late, it is a fait accompli.) Second, social sanctions and the loss of reputation for his
household may prevent him from bene¯ting from other community-based institutions.10 Moreover,
9Di®erential spending patterns across genders is not limited to developing countries. Browning et. al. (1994) and
Phipps and Burton (1993) show this to be the case for Canadian men and women and Bourguignon et. al. (1993)
obtain similar results for French households.
10In Kibera, such social sanctions give the defaulting member a `bad name'. As information spreads quickly in
the slum, such a sanction e®ectively implies that he loses access to other informal groups. Indeed, new membership
is never automatically granted, it is a decision taken by the general assembly of all members. It is usually preceded
by (i) a discussion among all members about the new applicant, (ii) an enquiry and application approval by the
governing body, and, often, by (iii) the acceptance by a member to sponsor the new applicant, for a speci¯ed period
of time. If the applicant/new member defaults during this period, the sponsor is ¯nancially responsible for all of the
obligations (due contributions, repayments, membership fees, etc.) the defaulting member has contracted towards
the group. Such schemes illustrate the degree of care exercised by these groups, which makes `social sanctions'
5as there are a large number of roscas, we assume here that the she can choose the amount of the
contribution, by choosing the appropriate rosca(s).
Notwithstanding these motives to join a rosca, the rationale is less transparent given that the
pot is eventually taken home11. At this point, the husband has access to the money and may well
decide to spend it on a purchase, other than the indivisible good. We present a simple model to
characterize the conditions under which, though this is feasible, the man chooses not to expropriate
the pot, even though he would expropriate the contributions if he could. In such a scenario, a man
is made worse o®, ex ante, by his wife's decision to join although he is ex post in accordance with
her plan to purchase the good.12
2.1. The model
Formal borrowing opportunities are not available, so the only means of saving is either through
direct storage or through a rosca. We introduce a simple household model which incorporates the
above con°ict by assuming that woman have a greater preference for an indivisible good than their
husbands. In a period in which the indivisible good is not purchased, the utility of a woman at
time t is represented by the following utility function:
Uw
t = u(ct) (2.1)
where ct is current consumption by the household in period t and u(¢) is increasing and concave.
Her utility in a period where the indivisible good, D, is purchased is given by:
Uw
t = u(ct) + D (2.2)
We assume here that the indivisible good yields services in only one period.13
particularly e®ective. Note also that in many roscas, a new member is often given the last number for some cycles,
in order to test his/her trustworthiness (for more details, see Baland and Platteau (2000)).
11Some roscas directly purchase goods for the members (see Appendix A, section 7.1). However, for more than
90% of roscas in our data, money is directly given to the member instead of an in kind transfer. Even then, the use
of the money is often overseen by the group, as illustrated in Appendix A (section 7.3, art. 13.c).
12Given this, there is the question as to why sellers (or schools) cannot accumulate the women's savings for her
instead of a rosca. There are several reasons for why this may not be the case, such as in°exibility in the expenditure
that such a scheme implies (for example, in case of an unexpected shock, one cannot change the nature of the good
which will be purchased) and trust in an unfamiliar agent (and, if the buying of more than one good is considered,
it requires trust in a corresponding number of traders). Additionally, the Besley et. al. argument still holds for at
least some people who receive the pot earlier each cycle.
13An alternative speci¯cation, used in Besley et. al. (1993), considered that services yielded by the indivisible good
extend to more than one period. The results discussed here are, however, robust to such a speci¯cation.
6Similarly, the utility of a husband at time t is de¯ned as:
Uh
t = u(ct) (2.3)
and,
Uh
t = u(ct) + ±D (2.4)
in a period where the indivisible good is purchased, where ± represents his relative preference for the
indivisible good. We assume that ± < 1 to re°ect his lower preference for the indivisible good than
his wife. Note also that, for expositional simplicity, we assume husbands and wives have identical
preferences with respect to present household consumption. We thus abstract from issues arising
from con°ict over current consumption across family members, to better focus on the con°ict arising
from di®erential preferences over the household indivisible good. Our argument would a fortiori
hold in such alternative settings, but with more complications. We also normalize the cost of D to
equal one.
The husband and wife jointly decide whether or not to purchase the indivisible good, and
thus choose the optimal household saving rate, sH¤
















At time t, the utility of the household is thus given by :
UH
t = ((1 ¡ °)± +°)D + u(ct) (2.6)
in a period in which the indivisible good is purchased, and
UH
t = u(ct) (2.7)
otherwise. The discount factor, ¢, is smaller than one, and °; where 0￿ ° ￿ 1, represents the
weight given to the wife's welfare in the household joint decision making. In each period, the
household budget constraint is given by:
Y w + Y h = ct + sH
t (2.8)
where Y w and Y h are the income received by the wife and her husband respectively each period,
and sH
t is household savings in period t with sH
t ¸ 0. The incomes, Y w and Y h; are assumed to
7remain constant throughout their lifetimes. Additionally, if the indivisible good is purchased, the




t ¸ 1 (2.9)
where TH represents the purchase date.










which implies that savings, when positive, are increasing through time: sH¤
t Á sH¤
t+1; for all t < TH:
Given this, the household will decide to save to purchase the durable good provided there exists
a saving pattern fsH¤








¢tu(Y w+Y h) ¸
1 X
t=0
¢tu(Y w+Y h) (2.11)
If this condition is not satis¯ed, the household is better o® not saving for the durable good and
sH¤
t = 0 for all t.
2.2. Rosca participation decision
We now introduce the possibility of saving through a rosca. We assume that the woman takes the
household decision described above as given, and chooses whether to participate in a rosca or not.
The structure of the game is as follows:
² Stage 1: the woman chooses her contribution to the rosca in each period t, 0 ￿ sR ￿ 1 and the
duration of the rosca, TR. (If she decides not to participate in a rosca then, sR = TR = 0:)
² Stage 2: the husband and wife jointly choose household savings in each period t, sH
t ¸ 0.
² Stage 3: when t = TR, the women receives the pot and the household decides its use.
There are two main situations to be distinguished. The ¯rst is the one in which the household
ex ante is willing to save in order to buy the good, that is condition (2.11) holds. The second
case is when, ex ante, the household is not willing to save for the good. We focus now on the ¯rst
8scenario, to derive the main results of the model. The second case will be considered at the end of
this section.
Assume ¯rst that the woman has access to total household income when choosing whether to
participate in a rosca. We explicitly address the case where she has only the use of her own income
later in this section. Note that, when condition (2.11) holds, the woman necessarily has an incentive
to save since she has a higher preference for the durable good. Therefore, there exists an optimal
sequence fsw
t g such that ,
TW X
t=0





¢tu(Y h + Y w) >
1 X
t=0
¢tu(Y h + Y w): (2.12)
The saving pattern the household jointly chooses is always smaller than fsw
t g.
Lemma 1. Since ± < 1; sw
t > sH
t , 8t; and Tw < TH; where Tw represents the date at which her
accumulated savings equal one.
As the household is willing to save on its own to buy the indivisible good, it is clear that, if the
woman, at one point in time, has enough accumulated savings to buy the good, the household will
use them to purchase the indivisible good rather than increase present and future consumption.
Moreover the household may contribute additional savings to those saved in the rosca. The woman
takes this into account when she chooses her optimal rosca contribution. We now formulate this
problem.
If a woman chooses to join a rosca14, and saves an amount sR ¸ 0, the household may decide
to add extra savings, ¾H
t , with ¾H








¢tu(Y h + Y w ¡ sR ¡¾H
t ) + ¢TR
((1 ¡ °)± + °)D +
1 X
t=TR+1












14We also assume that a woman always has a motive to save, i.e., she always prefer to join a rosca than not to
save, that is, there exists sR such that
P
s






















9Given this problem, the woman decides whether or not to join a rosca and the amount of her







¢tu(Y h + Y w ¡ sR ¡ ¾H¤










First consider the decision of the household. As household utility is time separable, the optimal
amount of savings at time t depends only on the amount of accumulated savings St : sH
t = sH (St) .
As a result, for a given St, the additional savings ¾H¤
t that the household chooses to contribute is
equal to the di®erence between the optimal household savings sH¤(St) and sR, provided sH¤ (St) >
sR; otherwise ¾H¤
t = 0. Thus, after the point where sH¤ (St) ¸ sR, the household will contribute
additional savings. Moreover, condition (2.10) implies that ¾H¤
t , when positive, is increasing at an
increasing rate. Lastly, as the woman's optimal saving pattern, sw¤
t ; also satis¯es condition (2.10),
if there exist t and t0 such that sw¤
t = sH¤
t0 , then sw¤
t+1 = sH¤
t0+1 and all consecutive savings are also
equal. (This property will be useful for Figure 1 below).
Turning to the woman's decision problem, we focus on the determination of her rosca contribu-
tion sR. Consider her optimal saving pattern in the absence of a rosca, sw¤
t . Necessarily sR < sw¤
Tw,
since otherwise, a woman would be oversaving in all periods. It is also the case that sR > sw¤
0 , since
rosca contributions are constant across time and sw¤
t is increasing in t. This holds even if ¾H¤
t > 0,
since, given any St, sw¤
t > sH¤
t . As a result, if sR < sw¤
0 , then necessarily sR + ¾H¤
t < sw¤
t and a
woman would be systematically undersaving compared to her optimal saving plan. Therefore, if a
woman joins a rosca, her rosca savings satisfy sw¤
0 < sR < sw¤
Tw. Moreover, as the household saves
less than she would like, she always has an incentive to join a rosca, as the resulting saving schedule
is closer to her own, i.e., she is at least better o® by choosing sR = sw¤
0 , but she can even do better
by choosing a higher sR. Therefore,
Proposition 1. If condition (2.11) is satis¯ed, a woman always joins a rosca and sw¤
0 < sR < sw¤
Tw.
The diagram below, where we use a continuous time approximation, illustrates this proposition.
10Figure 1: Rosca contributions and optimal saving schedule
The two optimal saving schedules, in the absence of a rosca, are represented by the curves
denoted sw
t and sH
t . Note that the shape of these curves is identical after the point at which
sH
t = sw
0 . The bold line represents the household total saving schedule (sR +¾H
t ) when the woman
joins a rosca. Given sw¤
0 < sR < sw¤
Tw, let t0 be the point at which sR = sw¤
t0 . As roscas imply a rigid
contribution schedule, the trade-o® a woman faces when joining a rosca is between her oversaving
in the ¯rst periods, until period t0 (area A), and her undersaving thereafter (area B). Note also
that, once the household contributes additional savings, ¾H¤
t , total household savings are upward
sloping.
The welfare implications are immediate: a woman is better o® by joining a rosca and her husband
is worse o®, compared to the situation prevailing when she does not join a rosca. This holds as
long as the household is the last to receive the pot. As the potential con°ict in the family is more
severe the later the pot is received, if, by chance, the household is the ¯rst to receive the pot, both
husband and wife are better o®. In other words, when the order of the rosca is known, husbands'
11welfare may increase with rosca participation provided the order is favorable enough.15
We now turn to analysing the role of changing parameters on the rosca participation and saving
decisions. We begin by focusing on the impact of a change in a woman's weight in household
decision making, °. A higher ° does not a®ect a woman's saving schedule, sw
t , but increases the
household propensity to save. In the diagram above, a higher ° thus causes the sH
t schedule to
shift upwards. Assume ¯rst that ° is high enough so that ¾H¤
t is positive for some t. As ° rises for
a given sR, the household contributes larger additional savings. She anticipates this when choosing
sR and decreases her rosca savings accordingly, thereby, reducing the oversaving bias in the initial
periods (i.e., area A in the above diagram). The saving schedule of the household becomes closer
to her own and sR is decreasing in °. By contrast, when ° is low, the household may decide never
to contribute additional savings. (This is necessarily the case if sH¤
TH ￿ sw
0 ). In this case, as °
decreases, there is no impact on sR, i.e., sR remains constant. Identical reasoning follows through
when ±, a husband's relative valuation for the durable good, increases.
Proposition 2. If a household is ex ante willing to save, the rosca contribution chosen by the
woman is non-increasing in her weight in household decision making, °. It is strictly decreasing for
high enough values of °.
Let us now consider the situation in which the household is not willing ex ante to save. First, it
may be the case that, even though it is not willing ex ante to save, if given a high enough stock of
accumulated savings, it may decide to save in future periods instead of consuming those savings. In
other words, there exists a stock of savings, Sk, and household savings path, sH






> 0, such that,
TH X
t=0





¢tu(Y w +Y h) ¸
1 X
t=0
¢tu(Y w +Y h +m¤
t)
(2.15)
15Some may argue that households, even when husbands and wives have con°ictual objectives, should agree on
some Pareto-e±cient outcome, as most conditions for e±cient contracting are ful¯lled. However, that household
decisions may not always be e±cient is discussed in Lundberg and Pollak (1996). Udry (1996) provides strong
empirical evidence that the household allocation of resources between male and female-controlled plots in Burkina
Faso is not e±cient. In our case, although the husband is potentially worse o® when his wife joins the rosca, he
cannot o®er her a credible alternative contract, since he would be tempted to renege and renegotiate on any saving
path he o®ers her. Moreover, it is not clear that, in any period, the woman can costlessly join a rosca corresponding
to her preferred contribution. As a result, chosing not to join the rosca in the current period, on the basis of her
husband's promises, renders her too vulnerable in the following periods.
12where m¤
t corresponds to the optimal dissaving pattern, Sk +
PTH
t=0sH




In other words, given su±cient accumulated rosca savings, the household will decide to save to
buy the durable good, instead of consuming it through an optimal dissaving pattern m¤
t. It may
even decide to contribute additional extra savings to the amounts thus accumulated. As a result,
the situation here is essentially the same as the previous case where the household was ex ante
willing to save (a situation which is reached by letting Sk tend towards zero). While for very low
levels of °, the household may not be willing to add savings to the rosca contributions, beyond
a given threshold, as ° increases, the household is increasingly inclined to contribute additional
savings, which in turn reduces the woman's rosca savings.
However, it is clear from equation (2.15) above that, as ° falls, the minimal amount of accumu-
lated savings, Sk, increases. When Sk reaches one, the household will agree to spend the pot on
the durable good in the last period. But as ° further falls (for adequately low values of ±), even
if the pot is equal to one, the household prefers to spend it on consumption than on the durable
good.
However, it is possible that, if accumulated savings exceed one, the household chooses to buy
the durable good and spends the excess savings on consumption. In other words, there exists Sk > 1
and c¤
t ¸ 0 such that,
((1 ¡ °)± + °)D +
1 X
t=0









t = Sk ¡1;
P
m¤
t = Sk, and c¤
t represents the optimal dissaving plan when the household
buys the durable good, and m¤
t when it does not. If the condition above holds, the woman can thus
convince her husband to purchase the durable good provided she brings home enough accumulated
savings. The household never adds voluntary savings on its own, and the rosca 'pot' is spent on
the durable good and on increased consumption. The size of the pot to be brought home is larger
the lower the woman's weight in the household decision making process. Note also that ° may be
so low (with relevant values of ±) that the condition above is not satis¯ed, and, whatever the size of
the pot brought back home, the household will always choose to spend it on consumption and not
buy the durable good. More importantly, as the size of the pot, and thus the savings accumulated
through the rosca, becomes large, the woman ¯nds this plan of accumulating savings through the
rosca less and less attractive. At the extreme, as the pot to be brought home becomes arbitrarily
13large, she will prefer to spend on current expenditures than embarking on this costly saving process.
There is thus a threshold value of °, below which the woman will decide not to save, given that the
amount of savings to be accumulated and brought back home to convince her husband to purchase
the good is too large.
2.3. Empirical predictions
The central implication of our theoretical analysis is that a woman's participation in roscas is a
strategy she employs to protect her income against claims by her husband for immediate consump-
tion and, thus, to bias household choices towards her own preferences. According to her weight in
household decision making, °, we thus have the following possibilities (for low enough values of ±):
1. ° very small: whatever the amount accumulated, the household does not want to buy the
durable good, or the saving process implied is too costly for the woman. Rosca savings are zero
and the woman does not join the rosca.
2. ° small: the woman needs to bring home a large amount of savings to convince her husband
(condition (2.16)). The size of the pot to be brought home is decreasing with °.
3. ° medium: while the household ex ante would not save, it agrees ex post to buy the durable
good provided some savings are already accumulated (condition (2.15)). If it does not add some
extra saving in the last periods, the rosca contribution does not vary with °. Otherwise, the rosca
contribution is decreasing in °.
4. ° large (Proposition 2): the household is willing ex ante to buy the durable good (condition
(2.11)), but the woman uses the rosca to increase the saving rate in the family. Her rosca contribu-
tion decreases with ° unless the household is still not willing to add extra saving to the accumulated
contributions. However, there is a value of ° above which, the household always contributes some
additional saving. As a result, for ° close to 1, sR decreases in °.
So far we have assumed that a woman has access to total household income. Consider instead
that she only has access to her own income. If her income is smaller than sH
0 , clearly participating
in a rosca is not worthwhile as it will not a®ect the saving pattern of the household. If her income
lies between sH
0 and her optimal rosca contribution, she will join rosca and save all her own income.
In this range, rosca savings are linear in the woman's income. Lastly, her income constraint is not
binding when Y w ¸ sR.
14We are now in a position to state our main empirical predictions. To this end, there are three
relevant considerations. First, for a given level of household income, there are good reasons to
assume that a woman's weight in household decision making is positively related to her individual
income or, more precisely, to her share in household income, ®; where ® = Y w
Y w+Y h. Second, for
the households under consideration, it is likely that women only have access to their own income.
Third, participation in a rosca also implies some ¯xed cost in terms of meeting attendance and
other social obligations towards the other members of the group.16 As a result, joining the rosca
will be worthwhile only if the expected bene¯ts are large enough to cover these costs. Therefore,
if we want to analyse the impact of a woman's relative income on her rosca participation and
contribution decisions, three e®ects come into play: the income constraint on her contribution, her
weight in household decision making, and the ¯xed cost of participating in a rosca.
For very low levels of ®; a woman's income is so low that she does not join the rosca but will
start to join for ® high enough. We also expect that when a woman's bargaining power, which
increases with ®, is very high, the household savings decision does not di®er much from her own,
and she will not join the rosca. Thus, for very high and very low levels of ®, the woman decides
not to join a rosca. In this sense, we would expect that:
Conjecture 1. The relationship between the probability of joining a rosca and female relative
income share, ®, is an inverted-U shape.
Moreover, the woman's rosca contribution ¯rst increases linearly with her income, as long as
her income constraint is binding. Once it is no longer binding, then the only impact of ® is through
° and therefore:
Conjecture 2. Rosca contributions are non-increasing in ®, and even strictly decreasing for ®
high enough.
This empirical prediction can be illustrated with the help of the following diagram:
16In most roscas, it is not necessary for members to be present when they make their contributions, as the treasurer
is usually in charge of visiting each member to collect the funds. However, general assembly meetings, typically
scheduled once a month, are important social occasions and last 3 to 4 hours (including greetings, praying, drinking
tea, etc.). Members who do not attend can be ¯ned and repeated absence can lead to exclusion (see Appendix A for
details).
15Figure 2: Rosca contributions as a function of woman's share in household income
We can test for these direct implications. To this end, there are several components of a
woman's weight in household decision making that should be related to her rosca participation.
Most importantly, rosca contributions and participation decisions are highest for average levels of
a woman's relative share of household income, and lowest for very high and very low levels of the
latter. Relatedly, women who work are arguably more likely to participate than those who do not
(recalling that these are households who are essentially below the poverty level and hence the fact
that higher status women can a®ord not to work should be irrelevant), particularly relative to their
husband's employment status. While household income should matter for the amount contributed
to roscas, it should have less (or no) impact on the decision to participate, once female weight
in household decision making is properly controlled for. Lastly, while gender and marital status
should be strong predictors of rosca participation, they should have no e®ect on the amount of
rosca contributions.
We have motivated our explanation for rosca participation by our empirical ¯ndings of predom-
inantly non-random roscas where the majority of participants are married women. The Besley et.
al. explanation relies on the fact that there is randomness to receiving the pot and suggests that
all individuals have a motive to join a rosca and hence cannot explain the demographic component
16of rosca participants. However, ignoring the issue of randomness, it may well be the case that the
Besley et. al. explanation is an additional motive for women to join roscas. That is, women want
to impose a higher savings rate on the household by joining a rosca (as our analysis suggests) but
also receive the bene¯t of receiving the pot earlier than if they had saved at home. If this is the
case, then our empirical prediction of an inverted-U shape relationship between female bargaining
power and rosca participation will not ensue. That is, although woman with a very low income
share will not join a rosca since the costs are too high, at very high levels of bargaining power they
will join a rosca. Since there exists the additional bene¯t of receiving the pot earlier they always
have the motive to do so.
3. Description of the data
The data used in the estimation were collected in 1996-7 in the slum of Kibera which is situated
on the outskirts of Nairobi and is one of the largest in Kenya. It extends over 225 hectares of land
and houses a population of approximately half a million people. The inhabitants are very poor.
They live with enormous risks to their health and income, with no access to formal insurance or
credit institutions. There is little intervention by the State to improve the well-being of the slum
population. As a result, individuals are left to their own devices to satisfy their most basic needs.
These circumstances have given rise to the formation of numerous informal credit groups such as
roscas, health insurance groups, funeral groups, saving and credit groups, and collective investment
groups.
We interviewed 520 households, all living in the same area of Kibera, namely the village of
Kianda. Households, selected through a random process, were interviewed over the course of 4
months during the spring of 1997. All household members were ¯rst surveyed for information on
their education, work activity, and income. Households expenditures were carefully recorded over
a week, with frequent visits by one of the enumerators. During the second round, each member
was asked detailed information on all informal groups which they belong to. From this process,
we collected information on 620 groups, of which 385 were roscas.17 (We carried out separately
17One fourth of the roscas in the sample perform additional functions, such as health insurance schemes, long term
investment projects, and self-employment schemes (see Appendix A, section 7.2 for an example). Such functions are
almost always clearly demarcated from the rosca itself: typically, rosca contributions are distinct from contributions
to the other activities of the group, and payments for the former are often made along a di®erent pattern than
payments for the latter. As a result, we have decided to consider all groups with a rosca as one of their activities in
17semi-open interviews with the governing bodies of 44 informal groups, to obtain more precise
information on their internal functionings.) The following table lists some background information
on these roscas:
Variable Mean
Number of members 15.77
Months existed 27.80
Contribute every day (% of roscas) 0.10
Contribute every week 0.35
Contribute every 2 weeks 0.06
Contribute every month 0.49
Length of cycle (median, in months) 6.07
Number of cycles (median, in lifetime of rosca) 3.21
Group comprises only women (% of roscas) 0.65
Group comprises only men 0.06
Group comprises both men and women 0.30
All members are same ethnicity 0.37
Order is unchanged each cycle 0.69
Started group with friends/relatives/neighbors 0.85
Group has secondary role (investment/insurance) 0.25
Table 1: Basic information on roscas
Implicit in our theory of rosca participation, and in the rest of the literature, is that a rosca
serves as a saving mechanism in order to purchase an indivisible good. An empirical prediction
of this relationship, as Besley and Levenson (1996) have investigated with data from Taiwan, is
that, controlling for income, households who participate in roscas exhibit higher ownership rates (or
expenditure levels) of durable goods. This is supported (for most income levels, expenditure and
ownership were higher) in our data for most indivisible goods and some of the results are presented
in the graphs below18:
our sample. The alternative would have been to consider groups which are only roscas, but this could have led to a
serious bias. In particular, in the survey, all possible alternative functions of the groups were carefully mentioned,
even when the latter was clearly of secondary concern for the respondent.
18Note that the relationship is not well supported for samples that were extremely small (such as camera ownership)
and for some goods for which close substitutes exist, such as charcoal burners and gas cookers. The relationship is
well supported for 12 out of 18 durable good categories.
18income group




Figure 3: Rosca participation and school expenses
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Figure 4: Rosca participation and clothing expenses
Out of all the indivisible expenditures, school fees are the largest expenditure: school fees
account for 36% of total non-food expenditures, other large expenses include rent at 22%, clothing
19at 18%, and medical costs at 12%.19 This coincides with the notion that women are saving for
their children and the household well-being. Let us brie°y examine the broad characteristics of
the individuals who participate in roscas. The 520 households interviewed represent approximately
2300 individuals. After omitting all individuals aged less than 16 years, we are left with a sample
of roughly 1300. A table of summary statistics is listed below.
All sample Rosca members Women in roscas Women not in roscas
Variable Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E.
Participates in a rosca 0.25 0.44 1 1 0
Total monthly rosca contribution 0 702 821 686 835 0
Female 0.53 0.50 0.84 0.37 1 1
Age 29.4 9.6 32.5 8.4 32.16 8.32 25.05 8.96
Married 0.59 0.49 0.71 0.46 0.70 0.46 0.42 0.49
Earns labor income 0.58 0.49 0.76 0.43 0.73 0.45 0.30 0.46
Has at least primary school 0.57 0.49 0.47 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.49 0.50
Monthly individual income if work 5389 5406 5290 6714 5019 7115 3182 3546
Household monthly income 8009 9207 8370 9456 8998 9330 8030 9337
Monthly food expenditures 5250 3031 4976 2761 5030 2787 5377 3038
Monthly luxury expenditures 368 723 367 700 324 670 307 665
Monthly children expenditures 1761 2550 1862 2902 1892 2778 1867 2598
Household size 5.05 2.14 4.8 2.1 4.96 2.01 5.20 2.12
Number of children 2.21 1.63 2.3 1.6 2.41 1.55 2.24 1.57
Years in Kibera 7.60 6.19 7.96 5.84 10.01 7.07 8.77 7.63
Native language: kikuyu 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.43 0.26 0.44 0.26 0.44
Native language: luhya 0.18 0.39 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.37 0.19 0.39
Native language: luo 0.40 0.49 0.38 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.35 0.48
Native language: kamba 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.26 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22
Native language: kisii 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.29 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.29
Number of observations 1269 324 271 406
Table 2: Characteristics of the population, rosca participants, female rosca participants and
non-participants
The most noteworthy di®erences between the ¯rst two columns are that the proportion of
individuals who are female, working, and married are much larger for rosca participants than for
the average individual in the sample. By contrast, the average number of children and the average
income level are the same across the two groups. Expenditure on children is slightly higher among
19School fees in this area are paid as a lump sum, usually each semester. Some delays in the payment of the fees
are typically allowed by the school administrators, which help parents to schedule the payments according to their
turn in the roscas.
20those who belong to a rosca. The next two columns illustrate the di®erences between women who
join roscas and those who do not. Most notably, while women in the two groups enjoy a comparable
total household income, women participating in roscas, on average, tend to be married, work more
often, and earn a higher individual income. They are also older and have lived in Kibera for a
longer time. By contrast, the number of children, household size, ethnic background (represented
by native language), education levels and expenditures patterns do not di®er much between the
two groups.
Our theory predicts that gender should be a signi¯cant determinant of rosca participation, but,
more importantly, if a woman belongs to a couple then she should be more likely to join a rosca.
These implications are supported by the raw data as is evident from the table above. Additionally,
our analysis predicts that a woman with a higher bargaining position within the household, relative
to her husband, is more likely to join a rosca and pay higher monthly contributions. jIn particular,
an inverted-U shape relationship between female's share of couple income and both rosca participa-
tion and contribution is predicted.20 Plots from the raw data support this inverted-U relationship.
The plots below are constructed using the average rosca participation and contributions across
married females within ¯ve di®erent income share groups. The percentage of married women in
each share group are as follows: 51% have an income share of 0%; 5% have a share larger than 0%
and smaller than or equal to 20%; 24% have between 20% and 40%; 15% have between 40% and
60%; 2% have between 60% and 80%; and 4% have greater than 80%.
20The main estimations of the paper thus include female's share of couple income as a regressor. We also run the
estimations using alternative measures of household power, such as the work status of females and their individual



































Figure 6: Female income share vs. rosca contribution
21The shares corresponding to the points on the graph are the middle percentages of the relevant income share
group.
224. Empirical estimates
We examine the implications of our model by estimating two main equations: the probability
that an individual participates in a rosca, and their monthly rosca contribution. We allow for the
possibility that the estimation of total rosca contributions is not independent of the probability
of joining a rosca. The two-stage Heckman procedure is used to control for this potential sample
selection bias. We alternatively could have used a Tobit estimation where it would have been
implicit that a zero rosca contribution is equivalent to choosing not to participate in a rosca. This
procedure seems somewhat restrictive given that the decision to join a rosca can be a separate
phenomenon to simply making very small contributions. This coincides with our discussion above,
where women must go against their husbands wishes to join a rosca and also generally incur a ¯xed
cost in terms of meeting attendance.22
The following table reports the results from a probit estimation of the probability that an
individual belongs to at least one rosca group. Since the functionings of roscas depend heavily on
the trustworthiness of its members, both native language and years spent in Kibera enter into the
estimation. These variables are used to proxy for individuals' trust in one another; as either they
share a common culture or su±cient time has elapsed to establish such bonds with other residents.
Additional regressors include the number of children, where a larger number should increase the
need to join a rosca. Household income should also be positively related to rosca participation, in
the sense that there exists the means by which to do so. However, it is easily argued that household
income is endogenous to rosca participation. Moreover, rosca contributions form a share of total
monthly income, on average equal to 13.3% of total income. To avoid this problem, we use food
expenditure to represent the wealth position of the household, which is independent of durable good
expenditure. Alternative estimations which include total income directly are listed in Appendix B,
where it can be seen that the main results are unaltered.23 Additional individual characteristics
are included in the estimation, such as age and education. The ¯rst estimation includes married
female's share in the income of the couple and its squared term (if an individual is either single or
22It is worthwhile to note that our main results are essentially unchanged in a Tobit estimation.
23Total income in these estimations include net transfers. Additional estimations were run with total income
excluding net transfers and transfers entering into the regression independently of income. The results for total
income were essentially unchanged from the results presented here, and transfers on their own entered into the
estimations insigni¯cantly.
23male then this variable is equal to zero). The second estimation includes instead dummy variables
re°ecting di®erent female income share categories. The categories of 40% to 60% and 60% to 80%
are grouped together because the latter category perfectly predicts a probability of one of joining
a rosca. The omitted category is a female income share equal to zero.
Variable @F
@X S. E. @F
@X S. E.
Female 0.222* 0.040 0.223* 0.040
Couple -0.123* 0.050 -0.123* 0.050
Female£Couple 0.180* 0.073 0.176* 0.073
Food Expenses -8.95e-06 1.2e-05 -8.93e-06 1.25e-05
(Food Expenses)2 1.75e-10 7.65e-10 1.73e-10 7.65e-10
Female share of Couple Income 1.038* 0.199
(Female share of Couple Income)2 -1.097* 0.243
Lived in Kibera for at most 2 years -0.085* 0.030 -0.086* 0.030
Number of children -0.0113 0.0087 -0.0115 0.0087
Primary school degree -0.032 0.026 -0.032 0.026
Age 0.0543* 0.008 0.0546* 0.008
(Age)2 -6.2e-04* 1.1e-04 -6.2e-04* 1.1e-04
Kikuyu -3.4e-04 0.042 -3.9e-04 0.042
Luhya 0.0234 0.045 0.0221 0.045
Luo 0.0021 0.038 0.0017 0.038
Kamba 0.191* 0.077 0.193* 0.077
Female income share >0 & ￿20% 0.172 0.13
Female income share >20 & ￿40% 0.278* 0.071
Female income share >40 & ￿80% 0.301* 0.084
Female income share >80 & ￿100% -0.048 0.083
Number of Observations 1267 1267
Pseudo R2 0.29 0.29
Table 3: Probit estimation of rosca participation24
Being a female, and being the female member of a couple are important determinants of rosca
participation. (Married males, on the other hand, are less likely to join a rosca, as represented by
the signi¯cant and negative coe±cient of the couple variable.) More importantly, female share of
couple income is a signi¯cant determinant of rosca participation. The second estimation directly
supports the inverted-U shape hypothesis, as predicted by our theory, where for a high female
weight in household decision making, household savings are close to female savings and the need
for a woman to join a rosca is less. This relationship is also found in the ¯rst estimation (higher
24In all tables, an asterix after the coe±cient denotes sign¯cance at the 5% level of the regressor.
24order terms enter negatively and signi¯cantly). In the plot below, the predicted values of rosca
participation rates from the ¯rst estimation are computed for varying female income shares and for


















Figure 7: Female income share vs. predicted rosca participation
Most of the other results have the predicted sign, except for number of children which is neg-
atively related, but insigni¯cant. Perhaps surprisingly, the general wealth level of the household
(represented by the expenditure on food) is insigni¯cantly related to rosca participation, however,
it is consistent with our theory; that it is the female's share of that income which is the important
determinant. As would be expected, years spent in Kibera is a signi¯cant determinant of rosca
participation, where individuals who have spent at most two years in the slum are less likely to
join a rosca. Native language (or ethnic identity) is also signi¯cant, thus supporting the notion
that familiarity and trust foster the possibility of informal collective arrangements. The age of
individuals is signi¯cantly related to the probability of joining a rosca where higher order terms
enter negatively into the estimation. If we plot the relationship between the predicted probability
of joining a rosca and the age of individuals, the relationship is concave and begins to decrease
at 35 years of age. These results coincide with the notion that individuals need time to establish
themselves and to develop more long standing relationships with others, but also with the idea that
25the demand for durables tends to be higher among younger individuals as found by Levenson and
Besley (1996).
The second stage estimation regresses similar variables on total monthly rosca contributions of
individuals. The variables to proxy for bonds and familiarity amongst group members (years spent
in Kibera and ethnic identity) are left out of the determination of rosca contributions. We use
these variables to identify the probability of joining a rosca in the ¯rst stage of the estimation. It is
important to note that when these variables are included into the estimation of rosca contributions,
they are in fact insigni¯cant (see Appendix B). This supports the notion that, once individuals have
formed their rosca groups, based on familiarity and trust, the actual amount of rosca contributions
depends on other factors. Since we are analyzing the problem from the perspective of individuals
rather than rosca groups, the dependent variable is the sum of contributions to all rosca groups
that a given individual belongs to. The table below lists the results from the regression on total
rosca contributions.
Variable Coe®. S. E. Coe®. S. E.
Female 186.6 245.3 134.5 220.8
Couple 245.4 257.1 258.0 262.7
Female£Couple -481.2 293.9 -455.6 299.7
Food Expenses .102 0.053 .107* 0.054
(Food Expenses)2 -4.4 e-06 3.4 e-06 -4.67 e-06 3.45 e-06
Female share of Couple Income 1688.2* 650.3
(Female share of Couple Income)2 -1285.3 783.2
Number of children -45.2 34.4 -44.2 34.4
Primary school degree -30.8 94.2 -36.2 94.7
Age 86.1* 43.3 78.0* 36.1
(Age)2 -1.10 .58 -1.02* 0.51
Inverse Mill's ratio 821.1 1272.9 2662.2 6197.0
Female income share >0 & ￿20% 54.1 291.1
Female income share >20 & ￿40% 233.7 154.5
Female income share >40 & ￿80% 493.5* 173.8
Female income share >80 & ￿100% 134.6 327.1
Constant -1167.6 736.0 -471.8 1402.0
Number of Observations 321 321
R
2 0.05 0.04
Table 4: Estimation of rosca contributions
Once again, the estimates con¯rm our theoretical analysis, as female share in couple income
is a signi¯cant and positive determinant of rosca contributions. Moreover, the second estimation
26shows that the relationship is likely an inverted-U shape. This result is also supported in the ¯rst

















Figure 8: Female income share vs. predicted rosca contribution
It is interesting to note, that unlike the probit estimation, the general wealth level of the
household (represented by the expenditure on food) is likely to be positively related, where higher
order terms are negatively but not signi¯cantly (see, however, Appendix B) related to the amount of
the contribution. That household income determines rosca contributions, but not participation as
such, is in line with our theory. More strikingly, in contrast to the participation decision estimates,
marital status and gender have no impact on the contribution amounts, as predicted by our analysis.
The inverse Mill's ratio is not a signi¯cant determinant of total rosca contributions.25 This suggests
that the two decisions are in fact independent. In other words, individuals do not choose whether or
not to join the rosca depending on the contribution amount. This may be because there are typically
many di®erent roscas to which an individual can participate, which allows for some °exibility in
the amount contributed. Alternatively, it may be because many roscas are formed with a small
number of individuals familiar to each other, who then negotiate together the amount of monthly
contributions. The age of rosca participants is again signi¯cant and similarly, if plotted, follows a
concave relationship.
25This result is further support against a tobit estimation.
27Since there is no interest to be gained by saving in a rosca, it is not the case that joining a
rosca directly increases the participant's income, and hence relative income share. However, it is
plausible that joining a rosca indirectly increases an individual's income by facilitating bene¯cial
social connections. As a result, a female's income share is potentially an endogenous regressor in
the above estimates. However, the Hausman test rejects this potential endogeneity when we use the
di®erence in total years employed in present occupation between the wife and husband to instrument
for a wife's relative income share. It makes sense that this variable, which proxies for relative job
stability, should a®ect relative bargaining power within the household but not necessarily directly
a®ect income. In any case it is an insigni¯cant determinant of rosca participation and contributions
and a signi¯cant determinant of female income share.
We also ran identical estimations to the above, where instead of female share in couple income,
we entered the work status of married females into one estimation, and married females' individual
income into another. Identical results ensued, where both of these indicators of females' household
bargaining power entered positively and signi¯cantly into both estimations, with higher order terms
of individual income negatively related to both rosca participation and the amount of contributions.
These results are listed in Appendix B.
5. An alternative explanation
A related motivation for rosca participation is that money kept at home is more vulnerable to
unexpected demands for help by relatives. Traditional solidarity networks usually pressure well-
to-do households to provide ¯nancial support to their less fortunate relatives (see, for example,
Platteau (2000)). In these circumstances, rosca participation can then be used as a way to render
savings illiquid and better allow the household to resist these demands in a socially acceptable way.
Suppose a household faces a probability, p, at each period, of being asked to give their savings
to a relative in need (and, as before, no one has access to formal credit markets). To keep the
discussion simple, assume that the household saves a constant amount s for t periods in order to
purchase an indivisible good which costs D, hence D = ts. It has a choice between accumulating
savings at home or joining a rosca. Although it seems clear that, when putting their savings in a
rosca, the money is safe from being stolen, however, what is still a concern is that when returning
home with the pot, they risk losing the entire sum of their savings by an unexpected claim. This
28expected loss is equal to pD. If they were to save at home, their expected loss in the last period
is similarly equal to pD. However, in addition to this risk, their expected loss in each period ¿ is
equal to ¿ps. Therefore the total expected loss over all periods is necessarily larger than pD. In
consequence, it is always worthwhile to join a rosca.
With a positive discount rate, however, the optimal saving rate is increasing, whereas in a rosca
the savings rate is constant. Therefore given the in°exibility of the saving scheme under a rosca,
one might argue that joining a rosca is not worthwhile if the probability of claims is su±ciently
low. However, this is not the case since the household is still strictly better o® by joining a rosca
for which the contribution is equal to their optimal ¯rst period savings, (i.e., the lowest amount),
while accumulating increasing excess savings at home. In such a scenario, the risk related to an
unexpected claim for help from a relative is thereby reduced. Note also that we are assuming that
the probability, p, is independent of the amount. But it is clear from the above reasoning that this
assumption is immaterial to our main point, but it implies that rosca participation is more likely
the richer the household.
This story however is not consistent with our empirical ¯ndings. Indeed, if this constituted
the main motive behind rosca participation, then income, rather than female share in household
income, should be the main determinant of rosca participation. By contrast, the fact that rosca
members are predominantly female can be consistent with the story above given that the division
of labour within African households could entrust women with the management of household sav-
ings. An even simpler explanation, also based on a desire for an illiquid saving mechanism, is to
conceive p as the probability of theft. In this case, to explain the predominance of married female
participation, we could consider that the main source of risk is the husband. This notion may
seem far-fetched but anecdotal evidence from interviews suggest that women seriously consider this
matter. More generally, it is fairly common in Africa for women to accumulate assets independently
and unbeknown to their husbands. However, in any case, neither of these interpretations can fully
explain the importance of a woman's relative income share in determining rosca participation and
contributions.
296. Conclusion
The present paper is based on detailed ¯eld observations of informal saving groups in the slum of
Kibera (Kenya). The starting point of our analysis is the observation that married women with
a regular income earning occupation were the most likely to participate in a rosca. To explain
this phenomenon, we propose a new argument based on di®erential consumption choices between
wives and their husbands. If women tend to prefer higher saving rates than the one chosen by the
household, they will use roscas to accumulate more savings. Even though, ex ante, her husband
and other members in the family would have preferred her not to start saving through a rosca,
they may ex post, once she receives the pot, agree with her plan to spend the accumulated savings.
Participation in a rosca thus increases woman's welfare at the expense of her husband. We also
show that rosca participation and contributions follow an inverted-U relationship with woman's
bargaining position within the household. The empirical tests carried out on our original data set
give support to this explanation.
307. Appendix A: Constitutions of informal groups in Kibera (excerpts)
7.1. Adundo Women Group
(...) Each member contributes 150 KSh for each meeting. With the contributions, the Organizing
Lady buys things for the house in which the meeting is being held.
(...) Meetings are held every Sunday from 3 pm to 5 pm. (...)
All members must attend the meetings. The ¯ne for not coming is 30 Ksh, even if the member
has an excuse.
7.2. Kibera Nyakwerigeria Group
Motto: Forward ever, backward never
Introduction: The vision of the forming of the group came on the 8th day of October 1995,
when a team of group members sat down with a main theme of:
Forming Nyakwageria group so as to uplift the standard of living by each member contributing
Ksh 500 to one member on every sunday of the week in a style of merry-go-round, and a monthly
contribution of Ksh 200 from every member towards the group to be put in an interest earning
account with a view to commencing projects of the group.
For the mutual welfare and successfully running of the group, the following rules and regulations
were set down:
1. On every sunday every week, the programme will start at exactly 2.30 pm with a prayer and
the meeting will close at exactly 3.30 pm with a vote of thanks from the chairman.
2. Every member must attend all the Sunday meetings and absenteism will be only accepted
with apology.
3. If a member misses to attend a meeting and without even sending his/her contribution,
committee members must establish the cause of his/her absence with immediate e®ect.
4. No member or anybody from outside is allowed to bring another member's contribution
when she/he is absent. For members who are parents, a son or daughter is allowed to bring the
contribution and for bachelors or spinsters, a close relative can be allowed to attend and contribute.
5. Late comers will pay a ¯ne of kshs 50.
316. If any member misses for three consecutive meetings without any proper reason, he/she will
be expelled from our group.
7. Any o±ce bearer who goes contrary to the rules and regulations of the group will be put o®.
(...)
10. Stern action will be taken against any member who may run away with members money.
(...)
14. For new members to join, all group members must be informed and they must consent to
the same. (...)
May God bless our group abundantly and let him be our guider in everything we do.
7.3. Garden Women Group-Kibera-Kianda (Nairobi)
(...) 2. Weekly meeting every saturday at exactly 2 pm.
3. Fine for lateness is 10/= up to 3 pm but coming to the meeting after 3 pm is 20/=.
4. Contribution for each house (Mary-go-round) is 50/= for each member. (...)
8. There should be no exchange of words or ¯ghting within members when we are in the
meeting.
9. Members should not wear trousers during the meeting.
10. No member should come to the meeting when drunk.(...)
13. End of the year party
a. Every member is to attend this party during which we utilize the funds collected from
the Fines' Account for buying sodas.(...)
c. Every member should make use of her money wisely, the ¯rst priority being buying
books, uniforms etc. for our school children.
7.4. Tumaini Women Group
(...) Punctuality
All members must be punctual. All meetings will begin at 2.00 pm with an allowance of ¯fteen
minutes after which anyone who is late will pay a ¯ne of Ksh 20.(...)
Secrecy
Members must maintain a high level of secrecy and nothing discussed in the meeting should
be repeated elsewhere or discussed with non-members. All issues discussed should be treated as
32con¯dential.
8. Appendix B
8.1. Estimation of rosca contributions including trust proxy variables
From the table below, we see that the variables which identify the probit estimation are indeed
insigni¯cant determinants of rosca contributions.




Food Expenses 0.101 0.0536
(Food Expenses)2 -4.39e-06 3.43e-06
Female share of Couple Income 1405.785* 608.68
(Female share of Couple Income)2 -1021.32 753.65
Number of children -44.58 35.05
Primary school degree 8.52 97.70
Age 57.24 36.40
(Age)2 -0775 0.507






Number of Observations 321
R
2 0.045
338.2. Alternative probit estimates of roscas participation





Female .226* .040 .223* .040 .222* .040
Couple -.120* .050 -.121* .050 -.125* .050
Female£couple .178* .073 .176* .073 .224* .073
Food Expenses -8.1 e-06 1.2 e-5 -7.8 e-06 1.3 e-05
(Food Expenses)2 1.52 e-10 7.6 e-10 1.1 e-10 7.7 e-10
Household income 9.4 e-07 1.69 e-06
(Household income)2 -2.1 e-11 4.1 e-11
Female share in couple income 1.01* .199
(Female share of couple inc.)2 -1.07* .243
Number of children -0.016 .008 -.012 .009 -.010 .009
Primary school degree -.034 .026 -.029 .026 -.036 .026
Age .055* 0.008 .054* .008 .055* .008
(Age)2 6.4 e-4* 1.1 e-4 -.001* .000 -6.3 e-04* 1.2 e-04
Lived at most 2 years in Kibera -.086* .030 -.083* .030 -.088* .030
Kikuyu -.000 .042 -.003 .042 -.011 .041
Luhya .028 .046 0.17 .044 .016 .045
Luo .006 .038 -.001 .038 .004 .038
Kamba .199* .077 .177* .076 .168* .076
Working female£couple .233 .055
Female income£couple 2.9 e-05* 8.1 e-06
(Female income£couple)2 -3.1 e-10* 1.4 e-10
Number of observations 1267 1267 1267
Pseudo R2 .284 .281 0.276
348.3. Alternative OLS estimates of Rosca Contributions
Dependent variable: amount of individual monthly contribution to rosca(s)
Variable Coe®. S.E. Coe®. S.E. Coe®. S.E.
Female 236 249 91.3 253 2.98 240
Couple 144 258 295 260 345 257
Female£couple -323 295 -491 296 -554 304
Food expenses .108* .054 .103 .054
(Food expenses)2 4.7 e-06 3.4 e-06 -4.6 e-06 3.4 e-06
Household income .009 .007
(Household income)2 -5.9 e-08 1.5 e-07
Female share of couple income 1915* 656
(Female share of couple inc.)2 -1619* 795
Number of children -28.8 33.3 -43.4 34.3 -31.7 33.9
Primary school degree -19.8 94.1 -11.4 94.6 -35.6 93.7
Age 98.5* 43.9 71.6 45.5 44.7 46.2
(Age)2 -1.20* .582 -.937 .602 -619 .606
Mills ratio 1981 1270 -106 1381 -871 1244
Working female£couple 318* 151
Female income£couple .068* .018
(Female income£couple)2 -7.6 e-07* 2.5 e-07
Constant -1086 736 -980 764 -498 783





[1] Ardener, S. (1964) \The comparative study of rotating credit associations", Journal of the
Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, 94 (2), 202-229.
[2] Baland, J.M. and J.P. Platteau (2000), "Informal groups in Kibera", mimeo, University of
Namur.
[3] Besley, T., S. Coate, and G. Loury (1993) \The economics of rotating savings and credit
associations", American Economic Review, 83, 792-810.
[4] Besley, T., S. Coate, and G. Loury (1994) \Rotating savings and credit associations, credit
markets and e±ciency", Review of Economic Studies, 61, 701-719.
[5] Besley, T. and A. Levenson (1996) \The role of informal ¯nance in household capital accumu-
lation: evidence from Taiwan", Economic Journal. 106, 38-59.
[6] Bouman, F. (1977) \Indigenous savings and credit societies in the third world: A message"
Savings and Development, 1, 181-218.
[7] Bourguignon, F., M. Browning, P. Chiappori, and V. Lechene (1993) \Intrahousehold alloca-
tion of consumption: a model and some evidence from French data", Annales d'Economie et
de Statistiques, 29, 137-56.
[8] Browning, M., F. Bourguignon, P. Chiappori, and V. Lechene (199$) \Incomes and outcomes:
a structural model of intrahousehold allocation", Journal of Political Economy, 102(6), 1067-
96.
[9] Bruce, J. (1989) \Homes divided". World Development, 17(7), 979-991.
[10] Calomiris, C. and I. Rajaraman (1998) \The role of ROSCAs: lumpy durables or event insur-
ance", Journal of Development Economics, 56, 207-216.
[11] Geertz, C. (1962) \The rotating credit association: a `middle rung' in development". Economic
and Development and Cultural Change, 10, 241-263.
[12] Gugerty, M.K. (1999) \Preliminary evidence on rotating savings and credit associations
(roscas) in Kenya: `You can't save alone"'. Mimeo, Harvard University.
[13] Handa, S. and C. Kirton (1999) \The economics of rotating savings and credit associations:
evidence from the Jamaican `Partner"', Journal of Development Economics, 60, 173-194.
[14] Hoddinott, J. and L. Haddad (1995) \Does female income share in°uence household expen-
diture? Evidence from Cote d'Ivoire", Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 57(1),
77-97.
[15] Kovsted, J. and P. Lyk-Jensen (1999) \Rotating savings and credit associations: the choice
between random and bidding allocation of funds", Journal of Development Economics, 60,
143-172.
36[16] Krahnen, J.P. and R. H. Schmidt (1994) Development Finance as Institution Building: A New
Approach to Poverty-Oriented Banking, Westview Press, Boulder/Oxford.
[17] Lundberg, S. and R. Pollak (1996) "Bargaining and distribution in marriage", Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 10(4), 139-58.
[18] Levenson, A. and T. Besley (1996) \The anatomy of an informal ¯nancial market: rosca
participation in Taiwan", Journal of Development Economics, 51, 45-68.
[19] Phipps, S. and P. Burton (1993) \What's mine is yours?: the in°uence of male and female
patterns of household expenditure", mimeo, Dalhousie University.
[20] Platteau, J. P. (2000), Institutions, Social Norms and Economic Development, Harwood Aca-
demic Publishers.
[21] Thomas, D. (1990) \Intra-household resource allocation: an inferential approach", Journal of
Human Resources, 25(4), 635-664.
[22] Udry, C. (1996) "Gender, agricultural production and the theory of the household", Journal
of Political Economy, 104
[23] van den Brink, R. and J-P. Chavas (1997) \The microeconomics of an indigenous African
institution: the rotating savings and credit association", Economic Development and Cultural
Change, 745-772.
37